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ABSTRACT 
The main question at issue is which view of copyright law the United States 
should adhere to.  Founders of American copyright law based our Constitution on 
utilitarian principles that promote the spread of knowledge and information to the 
general public.  It has always been held that innovation and creativity were of core 
importance in an efficiently functioning democracy.  With the passing of Section 
514, the United States digressed from its national roots in order to comply with an 
international regime of copyright law.  This decision in Golan takes steps to afford 
private economic benefit to a few copyright holders at the expense of the public at 
large: a notion against constitutional principles.  Congress and the Supreme Court 
have rationalized American compliance with international law at the great cost of 
impeding education and culture, discouraging business and investment, and 
creating a grey cloud over the public domain and copyright industry.  Prior to this 
decision, the United States has never succumbed to the pressures of international 
adherence at national expense, and we should not start now.  Again, if it is unfair 
for the neighborhood to lose out on Granny’s fruit baskets, it is equally unfair on 
the American public to lose access to works in the public domain.  
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate (2013), Pepperdine University School of Law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To depict the impact of following an international copyright regime on the 
American public, imagine the following story about Granny.  Granny is an elderly 
woman whose joy in life, for the last thirty years, comes from religiously 
gardening, planting, and maintaining her vegetable and flower beds.  Not only does 
she upkeep her own home and lawn, but additionally, Granny preserves the 
adjoining property to her land on which stand a few fruit trees and some open 
space where her grandchildren come to play.  Over thirty years ago, when Granny 
first moved to the neighborhood, she noticed the weeds and vines growing over an 
old unused shack on her neighboring property.  She visualized creating a spacious 
area where she could grow fruits and vegetables, picnic with her family, and put a 
swinging tire in for her grandchildren to enjoy during their yearly summer 
vacations to her house.  Granny is well aware of the limits on her property line, but 
the adjoining land has been vacant for as long as she can remember, and she takes 
pleasure in preserving the fruit trees, gardens, and lawn.  The neighbors all believe 
this property belongs to Granny, as she maintains the trees, collects the fruit each 
harvest, and creates baskets to give to the families in the neighborhood.  Over the 
years, Granny believes that she became owner of the land through adverse 
possession, as nobody has ever condemned her public use of the land.1  Now 
imagine how Granny would feel if one day somebody decided to claim they owned 
the land, and they could legally start charging her for the use of the trees and the 
fruit.  Granny is no longer allowed on the property without permission from a 
random stranger claiming he owns the land.  If Granny wishes to continue to share 
the fruit with the neighborhood, as she has been freely doing for over thirty years, 
she will be charged a fee determined by this unknown party.  Considering that 
Granny has been fairly and innocently utilizing the abandoned land for the benefit 
of the neighborhood community, does this situation seem fair?  Most likely not.  
Essentially, this is an analogous property law illustration of the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s recent copyright law decision in Golan v. Holder.2  The United 
States of America was founded on a principle of separation of power between the 
three branches of government.3  With respect to copyright law, in an effort to 
comply with an international regime, Congress has taken it upon itself to take 
works out of the American public domain and “restore” the authors’ rights in the 
original works.  Not only did Congress pass such legislation, but the Supreme 
Court affirmed in Golan the constitutionality of this statute.4  Petitioners are 
analogous to “Granny” depicted in the aforementioned scenario, and the impact of 
                                                            
1 JESSE DUKMINIER, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: PROPERTY 24 (Elizabeth L. Snyder et al. eds., 
2002).  Adverse possession is a concept in property law: a process by which a premise can change 
ownership without compensation, if the user of a certain piece of property establishes the requisite 
elements and no claim is brought.  The elements of adverse possession include: (1) actual possession, 
(2) open and notorious use, (3) exclusivity, (4) hostile or adverse use, and (5) continuous use.  Id. at 24–
30. 
2 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).  
3 “[T]he separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve 
to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power [between 
the branches] will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse . . . .”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1991).  
4 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874. 
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the legislation on the American public parallels that of the neighborhood 
community.  As illustrated above, had such measures been taken “with respect to 
well-established property rights, the problem would be obvious.  This statute 
analogously restricts, and thereby diminishes, Americans’ preexisting freedom to 
use formerly public domain material in their expressive activities.”5  However, the 
Supreme Court and Congress did just that by affirming the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision.6  This case note is a criticism of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
regarding copyright law in Golan.  Part II of the case note illustrates the legislative 
background, which frames the Supreme Court’s decision in the case.  Part III 
details the facts, procedure, and background presented to the Court.  Next, Part IV 
gives Justice Ginsberg’s reasoning on Supreme Court affirmation of the Tenth 
Circuit decision, which is followed with Justice Breyer’s dissent.  The subsequent 
sections, Parts V and VI, specify aspects of contention and criticism with the 
majority opinion, and outline the damaging impact of the decision on the American 
public. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
In order to comprehend the Supreme Court’s decision in Golan, it is 
necessary to understand the string of legislation, which creates the backdrop of the 
Court’s reasoning.7  The Court’s analysis of the impact of each subsequently 
passed legislative act in relation to the Copyright and Patent Clause of the 
Constitution sheds light on the argument at issue.8  In regard to copyright, this 
clause in the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings and Discoveries.”9 
The primary accord governing international copyright law, effectuated in 
1886,10 is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(“Berne Convention” or “Berne”).11  The Berne Convention was devised to create 
an international regime of copyright law, in which the 164 member countries agree 
                                                            
5 Id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
6 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).  
7 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Protection Act (“CTEA”), 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2012); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”); Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 109 (2000)).  Title 17 of 
the United States Code governs copyright law in America, where these agreements have been codified.  
See Harmonizing Copyright’s Internationalization with Domestic Constitutional Constraints, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1798 (2008) (discussing the emerging international framework of copyright law through 
various pieces of legislation and treatises). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 Id.  
10 Berne Convention, art. 18, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force July 24, 1971).  
The 1886 treaty has been subsequently modified: Berlin, 1908; Rome, 1928; Brussels, 1948; 
Stockholm, 1967; and Paris, 1971, and amended in 1979.  HOUSE REPORT OF THE BERNE CONVENTION 
IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100–609 (1988). 
11 Prior to the Berne Convention, national copyright laws typically only applied for works created 
within each country.  Harmonizing Copyright’s Internationalization with Domestic Constitutional 
Constraints, supra note 7.  For example, if a work was published in Germany, the German citizen 
would be protected by copyright in Germany, however, the work could be copied or sold by anyone in 
the United Kingdom.  Similarly, if an original work was produced in France, it could be protected in 
France, but not in another country. 
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to comply with two major principals: (1) minimum rights and (2) national 
treatment or reciprocity.12  The minimum rights principle requires all member 
countries to grant a basic level of protection recognized under this Convention.13  
The national treatment refers to the principle that member countries provide the 
same protections to authors in other member countries as they provide to their own 
authors.14  Interestingly, the United States did not become a signatory to the Berne 
Convention until 1988, over a century later.15   
The core issue in Golan v. Holder revolves around Article 18 of the Berne 
Convention, which “requires countries to protect the works of other member states 
unless the works’ copyright term has expired in either the country where protection 
is claimed or the country of origin.”16  Consequently, Article 18 requires that when 
a country joins the Berne Convention, it must provide copyright protection to pre-
existing foreign works, even if such works were previously a part of the public 
domain.17  In 1988, the United States joined the Berne Convention despite Article 
18; however, America did not provide protection for any foreign works lodged in 
the U.S. public domain.18  
Although Congress decided to join the Berne Convention, they took a 
                                                            
12 See Berne Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 2–19. 
13 Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5 (Article 5 classifies the Rights Guaranteed. 
Subsections (1) and (2) identify rights “Outside the country of origin”; subsection (3) identifies rights 
“In the country of origin”; subsection (4) defines “Country of origin”).  
14 Id.  
15 The United States had an entirely different system of transnational copyright protection from its 
European counterparts, where foreign works were excluded from protection under the Copyright Act.  
Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873, 879 (2012).  Copyright protection in the United States was largely based on 
authors’ (both domestic and foreign) “compliance with notice, registration, and renewal formalities.”  
Id.  Joining would have required distinct changes to U.S. copyright laws: “As Congress considered 
joining the Berne Convention, a major subject of its deliberations was whether Berne required the 
United States to grant protection to any foreign works in the public domain of the United States, and 
whether the Constitution permitted Congress to do so.”  Brief for Petitioners at 5, Golan v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2423674 at *5.    
16 Berne Convention, art. 18: Works Existing on Convention’s Entry into Force, reads:  
 (1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its 
coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of 
origin through the expiry of the term of protection. 
 (2) If, however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was 
previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of the country where 
protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew. 
 (3) The application of this principle shall be subject to any provisions 
contained in special conventions to that effect existing or to be concluded 
between countries of the Union. In the absence of such provisions, the respective 
countries shall determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of 
application of this principle. 
 (4) The preceding provisions shall also apply in the case of new accessions to 
the Union and to cases in which protection is extended by the application of 
Article 7 or by the abandonment of reservations. 
Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 18. 
17 Id.  
18 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874.  “A different system of transnational copyright protection long 
prevailed in this country.  Throughout most of the 20th century, the only foreign authors eligible for 
Copyright Act protection were those whose countries granted reciprocal rights to American authors and 
whose works were printed in the United States.”  Id.  Violations of the Berne Convention were not 
enforced at this time.  Id.   
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“minimalist approach”19 and adopted the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
(“BCIA”), which did not grant any protections to foreign works already in the 
American public domain.20  Thus, the United States was compliant with the Berne 
Convention even without the restoration of foreign works already in the public 
domain.21 
The United States’ non-compliance with the Berne Convention was 
dismantled in 1994, by the creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), a 
result of the multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Rounds.22  TRIPs 
extended protection, in compliance with Article 18, to all works of foreign origin 
whose term of protection had not expired abroad, regardless of their status in the 
public domain in the United States.23 
In response, Congress enacted Section 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act (“URAA”), which “gave works enjoying copyright protection 
abroad the same full term of protection available to U.S. works.”24  URAA Section 
514 grants copyright protection to pre-existing works of Berne member countries, 
protected in their country of origin, but lacking protection in the United States for 
any of three reasons: (1) the United States did not protect works from the country 
of origin at the time of publication; (2) the author failed to comply with U.S. 
statutory formalities; or (3) the United States did not protect sound recordings 
fixed before 1972.25  This legislation does not “restore” copyrights in foreign 
works that entered into the public domain through expiration of term of 
protection.26  Although Section 514 provides some protection for “reliance 
                                                            
19 Id. at 879.  BCIA “made only those changes to American copyright law that [were] clearly 
required under the treaty’s provisions.”  Id.  
20 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).  
21 Prior to 1994, the Berne Convention lacked teeth of enforceability because it allowed parties to 
declare that they were not bound by the agreement.  Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 33 (Article 
33 governs Disputes.  Subsection (1) outlines “Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”; 
subsection (2) identifies “Reservation as to such jurisdiction”; subsection (3) discusses “Withdrawal of 
reservation”).  The Berne Convention did not specify sanctions for noncompliance, which permitted the 
United States to be a member without conforming to the provisions set forth in Berne without 
repercussion.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880–81.  
22 See supra note 7.  TRIPs was the result of multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Rounds, 
which set forth the minimum standards governing intellectual property regulation and enforceable by 
the WTO through dispute resolution.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881.  TRIPs “mandated implementation of 
Berne’s first 21 articles.”  Id. 
23 “The WTO gave teeth to the Convention’s requirements: Noncompliance with a WTO ruling 
could subject member countries to tariffs or cross-sector retaliation.”  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881.   
24 Id. at 878.  
25 Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 
109 (2000)).  
26 The Berne Convention allows a copyright holder to receive protection for at least 50 years after 
the death of the author.  Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 7 (Article 7 governs the “Term of 
Protection”).  Therefore, if a work entered into the public domain due to expiration of this term, it will 
not receive the right to restoration governed by Section 514.  See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B).  
Prospectively, restoration places foreign works on an equal footing with their 
U.S. counterparts; assuming a foreign and domestic author died the same day, 
their works will enter the public domain simultaneously.  Restored works, 
however, receive no compensatory time for the period of exclusivity they would 
have enjoyed before §514’s enactment, had they been protected at the outset in 
the United States.  
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parties,”27 (such as the plaintiffs in the case) the constitutionality of this legislation 
is the core issue of Golan v. Holder.   
III.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioners in Golan v. Holder are a “broad range of artisans and 
businesses” comprised of orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers, 
and many others of the like, who have built their livelihoods upon the use of works 
in the public domain.28  They perform, distribute, sell, and exploit the publicly 
available works.29  The central issue underlying this case is the constitutionality of 
restoring copyright in a category of works produced by “foreign authors who lost 
those rights to the public domain for any reason other than the expiration of a 
copyright term.”30  Congress’s enactment of URAA Section 514 was to the 
detriment of petitioners—they were no longer able to freely enjoy the use of 
works, which prior to this statutory enactment, were not protected by U.S. 
copyright law.31  In September 2001, petitioners brought suit against the 
government challenging the constitutionality of Section 514 and the Copyright 
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”)32 under the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment.33 
The district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding 
that there was “no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via 
copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”34  The 
district court followed the presumption of statutes to be constitutional, and 
acknowledged “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to 
pursue the Constitution’s objectives.”35  Petitioners appealed to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
                                                            
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882. 
27 A “reliance party” is defined as a person who: 
  (A) with respect to a particular work, engages in acts, before the source 
country of that work becomes an eligible country, which would have violated 
section 106 if the restored work had been subject to copyright protection, and 
who, after the source country becomes an eligible country, continues to engage in 
such acts; 
  (B) before the source country of a particular work becomes an eligible 
country, makes or acquires 1 or more copies or phonorecords of that work; or 
  (C) as the result of the sale or other disposition of a derivative work covered 
under subsection (d)(3), or significant assets of a person described in 
subparagraph (A) or (B), is a successor, assignee, or licensee of that person. 
17. U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4)(A)–(C). 
28 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).   
29 Id.  
30 See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).  
31 Id.  
32 See supra note 7.  “Also known as the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the CTEA 
increased the duration of existing and future copyrights from life-plus-50-years to life-plus-70-years.”  
Golan v. Gonzales (Gonzales), 501 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2007).  
33 See Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. 
34 Id.   
35 Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01–B–1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754 *2 (D.Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).  
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The appellate court affirmed in part and remanded in part.36  The Tenth 
Circuit foreclosed petitioners’ challenge to the CTEA based on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.37  However, the appellate court recognized 
the need for legislation to fit within the express confines of the Constitution and 
concluded petitioners had “shown sufficient free expression interests in works 
removed from the public domain to require First Amendment scrutiny of [Section] 
514.”38 
Consequently, the case was remanded back to the district court to address 
this First Amendment issue in regards to Section 514.39  On remand, the district 
court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment determining that “to the 
extent Section 514 suppresses the rights of reliance parties to use works they 
exploited while the works were in the public domain,” was unconstitutional.40  
This time, the government filed a timely appeal.41  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
held “the government ha[d] demonstrated a substantial interest in protecting 
American copyright holders’ interests abroad, and Section 514 is narrowly tailored 
to advance that interest,” and consequently reversed the lower court’s decision.42  
In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to contemplate petitioners’ 
challenge, under both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, of Section 
514.43  The Supreme Court decided the case and Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was 
given on January 18, 2012.  
IV.  OPINION ANALYSIS  
A.  Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioners’ challenge 
that URAA Section 514 was unconstitutional under both the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment.44  Justice Ginsburg was joined by a 6-2 majority45 affirming 
                                                            
36 See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1076.  
37 Id.; see generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (petitioners sought a determination 
that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause’s ‘limited Times’ 
prescription and the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.  Supreme Court held the CTEA did not 
exceed Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause, and furthermore, the legislation was not in 
violation of the First Amendment).   
38 Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187.  
39 “We then remanded the case to the district court to assess whether [Section] 514 is content-based 
or content-neutral and to apply the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny,” Golan, 609 F.3d at 
1082 (internal quotations omitted).  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.  
40 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 
2010) aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
41 Government argued URAA § 514 did not violate the First Amendment.  Golan II, 609 F.3d at 
1082.  Plaintiffs cross appealed claiming the lower court failed to enjoin the Attorney General from 
enforcing the statute.  Id.  
42 Id. at 1083.  In the appeal the government argued that Section 514 advanced three interests: (1) 
compliance with international treatises and agreements, (2) legal protection of American copyright 
holders’ interests abroad, and (3) to remedy foreign authors past inequities.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit 
rejected arguments one and three, but found the government expressed an important government 
interest in two.  Id.  
43 Id. at 1076.   
44 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).   
45 Justice Breyer filed the dissent, with whom Justice Alito joins.  Justice Kagan took no part in the 
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the Tenth Circuit’s finding of Congress’s legislation to be “narrowly tailored to fit 
the important government aim of protecting U.S. copyright holders’ interests 
abroad,” and therefore within constitutional bounds.46  The opinion first addresses 
Section 514 in light of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, 
respectively.47 
In regards to the Copyright Clause, petitioners’ argument focuses on the 
“limited Times” language of the Constitution, which they contend is violated by 
the ability to “remov[e] works from the public domain.”48  However, the Supreme 
Court looks to their precedent set forth in Eldred to find the contrary.49  Justice 
Ginsburg declines to accept a constricted meaning of the word “limited,” but rather 
defines the term to mean “confine[d] within certain bounds, restrain[ed],” or 
“circumscribed.”50  Accordingly, she analogizes Section 514 to the CTEA and 
does not find the copyright lifespan to be unlimited, and thus, is within the 
constitutional limits as found in Eldred.51  
Furthermore, in regards to the Copyright Clause, petitioners argue that 
historically federal copyright legislation has not affected works in the public 
domain, thus distinguishing this case from Eldred.52  However, Justice Ginsburg 
cites the Copyright Act of 1790 to illustrate that “the First Congress . . . did not 
view the public domain as inviolate.”53  Furthermore, Ginsburg references 
subsequent unchallenged private bills that effectively restored copyrights of works 
previously in the public domain.54  The Supreme Court respects the separation of 
power between the government branches, as they do not question Congress’s 
                                                            
consideration or decision of this case.  Id. at 877. 
46 See id. at 875.   
47 Id. at 878–82.   
48 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 22.  Petitioners’ believe the constitution is violated “by 
turning a fixed and predictable period into one that can be reset or resurrected at any time, even after it 
expires.”  Id.  
49 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2002).  Similarly, in Eldred, petitioners challenged the 
constitutionality of the CTEA, which lengthened the term of the copyright by 20 years.  Id.  However, 
the Supreme Court upheld the legislation, inferring a less restrictive meaning of the term “limited.”  Id.  
50 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
51 Justice Ginsburg refutes petitioners’ argument that the limited time passed for works in the public 
domain, explaining “the copyrights of restored foreign works typically last for fewer years than those of 
their domestic counterparts.”  Id.  Petitioners go one step further in concluding that with Congress’s 
legislation “perpetual copyright terms would be achievable.”  Id.  However, the Supreme Court again 
looks to Eldred to counter, explaining, “the hypothetical legislative misbehavior petitioners posit is far 
afield from the case before us. . . . Congress can hardly be charged with a design to move stealthily 
toward a regime of perpetual copyright.”  Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 886.  The Copyright Act of 1790 granted protection to maps, charts, books, or books 
already printed, thus in the public domain, of the United States.  Id.   
54 Id. at 886–87.  See Corson Act (1849); Helmuth Act (1874); Jones Act (1898); see also McClurg 
v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843) (upholding Congress’s restoration of an invention to 
protected status); Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815) (upholding Congress’s passage of a 
private built restoring patent protection).  In this discussion the Supreme Court includes Acts passed by 
Congress in 1919 and 1941, which authorized the “President to issue proclamations granting protection 
to foreign works that had fallen into the public domain during World Wars I and II.”  Golan, 132 S. Ct. 
at 887.  But see Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966) (denying the authorization of issuance 
of patents whose effects remove existent knowledge or restrict free access to materials already in the 
public domain).  
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political choice to embrace Berne unstintingly.55  Accordingly, the Court finds that 
United States compliance with Berne’s international copyright regime is a “signal 
event” justifying the restoration of works in the public domain.56 
Lastly, in regards to the Confrontation Clause, petitioners argue that Section 
514 does not “spur the creation of . . . new works,”57 hence the federal legislation 
does not “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”58  Yet the Supreme 
Court finds this argument invalid stating, “the creation of at least one new work . . . 
is not the sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learning.”59  The Court 
reasons the dissemination of works as an equivalent means to promote science and 
the spread of knowledge, as the creation of new works.60  An efficient international 
copyright system should encourage the spread of current and future works, thus 
Congress believes full compliance with the Berne Convention would expand the 
foreign market and stimulate the protection of privacy of U.S. works abroad.61  
The Court does not refute petitioners’ argument for the need to incentivize creation 
of new works in order to advance and spread knowledge and learning.  However, 
the majority concedes that creation is not the sole way Congress may use to 
“promote the Progress of Science,” taking a more flexible approach that aligns 
with the standards of the Berne Convention.62  
Next, the Supreme Court tackles petitioners’ argument that Section 514’s 
restoration offends First Amendment concerns of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression.  Again, the Court analogizes this case to Eldred, observing “that the 
Framers regarded copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in 
which expressive works may be used . . . [but] also saw copyright as an ‘engine of 
free expression.’”63  The Court believes “copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” and that copyright jurisprudence 
accommodates the First Amendment.64  Ginsburg explains that the fair use 
defense65 and idea/expression dichotomy66 are inherent in copyright protection, 
                                                            
55 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887.  
56 Id.  
57 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 24.  
58 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–88.  “Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its 
patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
59 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.  The Supreme Court again quotes its decision in Eldred, “rejecting the 
notion that ‘the only way to promote the progress of science [is] to provide incentives to create new 
works.’”  Id.  (citation omitted); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003).  
60 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprs., 471 U.S. 539, 
558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).  
61 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.  
62 Id. at 888–89.  
63 Id. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 558). 
64 Id.  The Supreme Court describes various accepted aspects of copyright protection including, the 
fair use defense, idea/expression dichotomy, and speech protective purposes as the “traditional 
contours” of copyright protection which accommodate for First Amendment concerns.  Id. 
65 In regards to fair use, which is codified at 17 U.S.C. §107, Ginsburg explains:  
The fair use of copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . 
. for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”  This limitation on exclusivity “allows the public to 
use not only facts and ideas contained in copyrighted work, but also [the 
author’s] expression itself in certain circumstances. 
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which balances the First Amendment and the Copyright Act.67  Through Section 
514, Congress adopts a measure to simplify the United States’ transition to follow 
an international copyright regime.  Because Section 514 does not disturb the fair 
use and idea/expression aspects of copyright law, the “speech protective purposes 
and safeguards” are met.68  Encompassed in Section 514, Congress “deferred the 
date from which enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration on 
‘reliance parties’ who exploited foreign works [previously] denied protection,” 
thus accounting for First Amendment concerns.69 
Although petitioners believe the First Amendment safeguards inherent in 
copyright law infringe upon the “vested rights” they enjoyed in works that had 
already entered the public domain, the Supreme Court rejects this notion.70  Again, 
the Supreme Court capitalizes upon historical records to demonstrate that nothing 
in “our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude for 
copyrighted works that were once in the public domain.”71  Petitioners misinterpret 
having “vested rights” in foreign works they believe they acquired when they were 
able to utilize an unimpeded exploitation of such works.72  However, the Supreme 
Court clarifies petitioners’ misconception of their “vested rights”: “[a]nyone has 
free access to the public domain, but no one, after the copyright term has expired, 
acquires ownership rights in the once protected works.”73  Through Section 514, 
Congress does not “impose a blanket prohibition on public access,” because users 
can exploit the works through fair use or by paying a royalty for the desired 
exploitation of the author’s expression.74  This legislation fully implements the 
standards of the Berne Convention, which mandates both foreign and domestic 
works be governed by the same legal regime.75   
The Supreme Court, along with Congress, believes “Section 514 continue[s] 
the trend toward a harmonized copyright regime by placing foreign works in the 
position they would have occupied if the current regime had been in effect when 
                                                            
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).  
66 In regards to the idea/expression dichotomy, codified at 17 U.S.C. §102(b), Ginsburg writes: 
In no case does copyright protec[t] . . . any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in [the copyrighted] work.”  “Due to this 
[idea/expression] distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work 
becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of 
publication”; the author’s expression alone gains copyright protection. 
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219), see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 
U.S. at 556. 
67 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91.   
68 Id. at 891. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 892. 
73 Id.  “Copyright in a work protected . . . vests initially in the author . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 201(a) 
(2006).  “Once the term of protection ends, the works do not revest in any rightholder.  Instead, the 
works simply lapse into the public domain.”  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892.  
74 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892.  The Supreme Court acknowledges that would-be users can no longer 
utilize the foreign works free of charge.  However, the right to perform a musical work can be obtained 
in the marketplace, which users acquire through monetary compensation to U.S. authors.  Id. 
75 Id.  
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those works were created and first published.”76  The Supreme Court finds this 
legislation to be within the confines of the Constitution under the belief that there 
is a great need for the United States to comply with an international copyright 
regime.77  
B.  Justice Breyer’s Dissent  
Justice Breyer dissents because in his view, the Copyright Clause does not 
authorize Congress to enact this statute because it does not encourage anyone to 
produce a single new work.78  Breyer understands the “economic philosophy 
behind the Copyright Clause” to be one which grants copyright holders a limited 
monopoly via private benefit for the public purpose of eliciting the creation of new 
works.79  As the majority finds historical precedent in governing its viewpoint, 
Breyer cites the Statute of Anne as the basis for the Framers’ construction of the 
Constitution.80  This statute encouraged “learned Men to compose and write useful 
Books,” hence encouraged the creation of works, not merely the dissemination as 
the majority notes.81  
Breyer identifies and contrasts two underlying views of copyright law: the 
“utilitarian view” generally recognized in the United States, and the “natural rights 
view” generally followed in continental European copyright law.82  The utilitarian 
view, followed by Founders of the Constitution Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, embraces the notion that the monopoly granted to copyright authors 
serves as “compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community.”83  The 
Founders believe this monopoly encourages authors to pursue ideas and create 
works, which may produce utility to the benefit of the general public.84  This view 
contrasts the “natural rights” view grounded in the notion that “author[s] and 
inventor[s] have inherent rights to the fruits of their labor.”85  The natural rights 
theory heightens the importance of authors’ rights, as opposed to the importance of 
social gain, highlighted in the utilitarian view.86 
This legislation takes works from the public domain, and restores copyright 
                                                            
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 893–94.  
78 Id. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
79 Id. at 900.  Breyer analogizes this monopoly as a two-edged sword.  Id.  On one side, it 
encourages production of new works because absent copyright protection, works could be freely 
exploited without having to incur the cost of creation; consequently, this would deter authors from 
producing new works.  Id.  On the other side, copyright protection restricts dissemination due to the 
economic marketplace and high administrative costs it imposes.  Id.  
80 See supra text accompanying note 54.  The Statute of Anne is Britain’s 18th Century copyright 
statute.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in 
the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 
1444–50 (2010) (stating that the objective of copyright was to encourage authors to produce new works 
and thereby improve learning).  
82 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
83 Id. at 901 (citation omitted).  
84 Id. at 901–02; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379 (J.Looney ed. 2009).  
85 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 902 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
86 Id.  
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to foreign authors.87  The dissent analyzes the two ways in which this legislation 
restricts the dissemination of such works.88  First, consumers that previously used 
works for free are now charged fees by “restored copyright holders,” and second, 
the legislation creates administrative costs.89  The administrative burden is 
particularly high in what the dissent identifies as “orphan works”; these are 
millions of works of minimal commercial value whose copyright owners are nearly 
impossible to identify.90  Since the legislation creates high costs to utilize these 
works, it essentially prevents use of culturally invaluable material to the public, 
thus “aggravating the already serious problem of cultural education in the United 
States.”91 
Justice Breyer concedes “that ordinary protection also comes with 
dissemination-restricting royalty charges and administrative costs”; however, he 
deems the costs imposed by this legislation to be especially harmful and 
inordinately high.92  Historically, “Congress has long sought to protect public 
domain material when revising the copyright law.”93  However with this 
legislation, Congress’s ability to take works from the public domain “abridges” the 
American public’s constitutionally inherent right to freedom of speech granted by 
the First Amendment.94  Moreover, Justice Breyer identifies restricting use of 
previously available material, reversing payment expectations of existing users of 
                                                            
87 Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 
109 (2000)).  See supra note 7. 
88 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 904–05.  The dissent identifies administrative costs “as the costs of determining whether a 
work is the subject of a restored copyright, searching for a restored copyright holder, and negotiating a 
fee.”  Id. at 905 (internal quotations omitted). 
90 Id.  “According to European Union figures there are 13 million orphan books in the European 
Union (13% of the total number of books in-copyright there), 225,000 orphan films in European film 
archives, and 17 million orphan photographs in United Kingdom museums.”  Id.  
91 Id.  The dissent exemplifies the problem by stating:   
[T]he Los Angeles Public Library has been unable to makes its collection of 
Mexican folk music publicly available because of problems locating copyright 
owners, that a Jewish cultural organization has abandoned similar efforts to make 
available Jewish cultural music and other materials, or that film preservers, 
museums, universities, scholars, database compilers, and others report that the 
administrative costs associated with trying to locate foreign copyright owners 
have forced them to curtail their cultural, scholarly, or other work-preserving 
efforts. 
Id. at 905–06. 
92 Id. at 906.  Although Justice Breyer believes the majority is correct in its analytical process, the 
majority stops its inquiry, as they did in Eldred, by concluding that copyright law inherently restricts 
dissemination or works and has associated administrative costs; see supra text accompanying notes 64–
66.  However, the dissent distinguishes the current issue from Eldred, because unlike in Eldred, in this 
case “an easily administrable standard is available—a standard that would require works that have 
already fallen into the public domain to stay there.”  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
93 Golan, 132 S. Ct at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 
470, 484 (1974) (stating trade secret protection is compatible with the policy of keeping works in the 
public domain there); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (not allowing Congress to 
authorize patents that effectively remove existent knowledge from the public domain).  Contra supra 
note 54. 
94 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  This will place an additional burden on 
American consumers of these works, who will now have to seek answers to questions such as, “Is the 
work eligible for restoration under the statute?  If so, who now holds the copyright—the author?  an 
heir?  a publisher?  an association?  a long-lost cousin?  Whom must we contact?  What is the address?  
Suppose no one answers?  How do we conduct a negotiation?”  Id.  
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these works, and rewarding individuals at the public’s expense, as examples of the 
speech-related harms created by this Act.95  For the purposes of this case, the 
dissent limits its finding to show only the presence of a First Amendment issue.96   
The core of the dissent’s arguments comes from its conclusion that the Act 
does not provide the public with the incentive to produce new works, which it 
identifies to be the essence of American copyright law.97  Additionally, the 
argument enumerates a “virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing the 
withdrawal of works from the public domain,” directly contradicting the findings 
of the majority opinion.98  Furthermore, the dissent is at despair with the majority’s 
interpretation that the Copyright Clause does not require the creation of new 
works, but rather, can promote its motives in other ways.99  This Act “for the most 
part covers works that the author[s] did not expect to protect in America,” hence 
Justice Breyer finds the majority’s conclusion to be false.100   
V.  CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION 
A.  The Foundation of American Copyright Law: Historical Precedent 
In order to evaluate the Supreme Court decision in Golan, it is essential to 
look at how the Framers interpreted the Copyright Clause, and what they intended 
to accomplish through American copyright law.101  Modern day copyright law in 
                                                            
95 Id. at 907–08.  It will be difficult for members of society such as artists, musicians, universities, 
and scholars that previously enjoyed the works in the American public domain to obtain permission to 
use any lesser known foreign work, with the additional burden of now owing payment to the original 
authors for works they have long been using.  Id. at 905.   
96 “I need not decide whether the harms to that interest show a violation of the First Amendment.”  
Id. at 907.  
97 Id. at 908.  This directly contradicts the majority’s conclusion that the Copyright Clause does not 
“operate to induce new works.”  Id. at 888 (majority opinion).  Therefore, the essence of this debate is 
whether the Constitution should be interpreted to induce the creation of new works, or if the 
dissemination of works (as the majority believes) will suffice as a means of promoting the “Progress of 
Science.”  Id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
98 Id. at 909.  See, e.g., Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 
Stat. 2860 (1988); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (all pieces of 
legislation that did not extend protection to works in the public domain).  The majority opinion 
references legislation, which retroactively granted protection, as the legislation at issue does.  See supra 
note 54.  However, the dissent distinguishes this line of legislation because they were granted in special 
circumstances, such as wartime, natural disasters, and the like.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 909 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Breyer finds it “farfetched” to analogize those laws to the present law.  Id. 
99 Id. at 909–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “The industry experts to whom the majority refer argue 
that copyright protection of already existing works can help, say, music publishers or film distributors 
raise prices, produce extra profits, and consequently lead them to publish or distribute works they might 
otherwise have ignored.”  Id. at 909.  However, this is flawed because, as the dissent points out, “simply 
making the industry richer does not mean the industry . . . will distribute works not previously 
distributed.”  Id. at 910.  This argument by the majority basically states that giving extra monetary 
reward to authors for already created works will somehow incentivize these authors to create new 
works.  However, this view does not acknowledge “the special economic circumstances that surround 
the nonrepeatable costs of the initial creation of ‘Writing.’”  Id. at 901.  Thus, the dissent reads the 
Copyright Clause, unlike the majority, to encourage the creation of new works for the progress of 
society.   
100 Id. at 909.  
101 Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Forcing the Copyright Genie Back into the Bottle: Public Policy 
Implications of Copyright Extension Legislation, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 327, 338 (2004) (“The Framers of 
the Constitution recognized that a constantly refreshed public domain is essential because it serves as a 
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the United States should align with its historical roots as determined by our 
Founding Fathers.  The objective of early American copyright statutes “was to 
encourage authors to produce new works and thereby improve learning.”102  
Through their letters, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison emphasized the “high 
democratic value of access to knowledge,” while remaining wary of 
monopolies.103  Jefferson and Madison grounded the foundation of the 
Constitution under a belief that an informed public was essential to a functioning 
democratic system.104  This demonstrates the Framers’ intent was to encourage 
“creativity and innovation via a balanced system of incentives.”105 
The Framers embraced a utilitarian view of copyrights and patents, which 
provides authors with compensation for the benefits gained by society through the 
publication of their works.106  In the utilitarian perspective, monopolies encourage 
people to pursue ideas that produce utility.107  This stands at odds with the 
continental European basis for copyright law, which follows the natural rights 
theory.108  According to this dichotomy, copyright law founded in coherence with 
the utilitarian theory should encourage works to remain in the public domain, in 
order to benefit the greatest number of people.109  However, it seems with Section 
514, Congress has deviated from the roots of American copyright law in an effort 
to follow an international regime.   
The majority argues that this legislation is an attempt to put foreign 
copyright holders on the same foot as their American counterparts.110  However, 
this Court fails to acknowledge that this legislation gives preferential treatment to 
foreign authors who did not follow certain regulations and statutory formalities.111  
                                                            
foundation of new works.”).  
102 Kuhne, supra note 101, at 330 (discussing how American copyright law provides incentives for 
control and opportunities for profit in order to motivate authors and artists to create original works).   
103 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote, “the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to warrant anything other than their 
suppression.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 443 (J. Boyd ed., 1956).  
104 See Brief for Public Domain Interests, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–26, 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470829.  James Madison wrote, “A 
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a 
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who 
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”  Letter 
from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (1910). 
105 Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 26; see U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (“Congress in 1790 enacted the first federal patent and 
copyright law, 1 Stat. 109, and ever since that time has fixed the condition upon which patents and 
copyrights shall be granted.  These laws . . . are the supreme law of the land.”); Brief of H. Tomas 
Gomez-Arostegui & Tyler T. Ochoa as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. 
Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470823 (concluding the historical record does not support the 
view that the First Congress believed it was removing works from the public domain by enacting the 
1790 Act). 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.  
107 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
108 “Premised on the idea that an author or inventor has an inherent right to the fruits of his labor.”  
Id. at 902.  The natural rights view places a stronger emphasis on the rights of the authors, rather than 
the advancement of public welfare.  Id.  
109 Id.  
110 See supra text accompanying note 76.  
111 Brief for Creative Common Corp. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 6, Golan v. 
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American counterparts have made the same mistakes as foreign authors, yet are not 
afforded any recourse.”112   
The United States was over a century late in signing the Berne Convention, 
and did not find the need to implement Article 18 until 1994, when Section 514 
was adopted.113  Originally, Article 18 was not implemented because of concerns 
over the constitutionality of restoring copyrights to works existing in the public 
domain, thus showcasing Congress’s reservations to comply with an international 
standard.114  Congress’s decision to adhere to the international system set forth by 
Berne was to highlight the government’s interest115 in “persuad[ing] foreign 
countries to allow American holders of preexisting copyrights to charge foreign 
customers more money for their products.”116  Congress believed retroactivity 
would be the best way to gain protection of American copyright holders in 
emerging foreign markets.117  However, this argument places the concerns of a 
private benefit over the public benefit, which goes against the grain of which our 
Constitution was founded.118  
In cases regarding intellectual property, the Supreme Court has recognized 
the importance of materials in the public domain.  In regards to patent law, the 
Court has adhered to a utilitarian theory stating, “[t]he efficient operation of the 
                                                            
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470826.  
112 Id.  American authors are not granted copyright restoration or relief from their failure to follow 
copyright formalities, unlike foreign authors who benefit from Section 514.  See Brief of Justice and 
Freedom Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) 
(No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470825.  This essentially, “tak[es] the right to speak from some and giv[es] it 
to others.”  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).  
113 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
114 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 51 (1988), quoted in 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 24:21 (2008). 
115 “But there is no legitimate interest in giving away public speech rights in the hope of creating 
private economic windfalls.  Nor was there any substantial evidence to conclude the government’s give-
away would be reciprocated, or to what degree, and to what specific benefit.”  Brief for Petitioners, 
supra note 15, at 17.  
116 Golan, 132 S. Ct at 910 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “[F]ailure to [comply with Article 18] will . . . 
undermine the ability of the United States to press other countries to implement the same sort of 
protection in their implementing legislation currently pending . . . around the globe.”  Id. (statement of 
Matt Gerson, Vice President for Congressional Affairs, Motion Picture Assn. of America) (statement of 
Eric Smith, Executive Director and General Counsel, International Intellectual Property Alliance). 
117 Id.  
While the protection of U.S.-based copyright holders can certainly be a 
substantial interest, the connection between that interest and Section 514 literally 
depends upon speculation and conjecture regarding the conduct of other 
sovereign nations. While the political branches have discretion to make 
judgments in areas of foreign relations (Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 
(1984)), this does not give them carte blanche to set up any given policy as a 
substantial government interest because of its hoped-for indirect effects on other 
countries’ actions towards U.S. stakeholders. When a proposed regulation 
impacts constitutional concerns at a level requiring more than cursory scrutiny, 
there must be a definite, direct, and material relationship between the foreign 
government’s protection of U.S. interests and the statute that faces constitutional 
scrutiny.  
Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner at 10, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470822 (emphasis added).  
118 It is an argument of how to obtain more money from the sales of existing products versus how to 
promote and protect the creative and innovative process.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 910 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
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federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, 
unpatented design.”119  The Patent Clause in the Constitution reflects the “balance 
between the need to encourage innovation,” and avoid monopolies.120  Congress 
does not authorize “patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from 
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”121  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously stated that issuing patents to already 
publicly held information would “serve no socially useful purpose, but would in 
fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.”122  
Therefore, it follows that American copyright law precedent favors the stimulation 
of creative works and monopolies, for the purpose of disbursing knowledge for the 
greatest public gain.123  The Supreme Court in Golan has digressed from its 
historical precedent and has deviated from the “bedrock principle” of American 
copyright law by restoring copyrights in works already in the public domain.124  
In light of the global economy, it is understandable that Congress feels 
pressure to comply with the international system of copyright law set forth in 
Berne.  However, the United States enjoyed the benefits of Berne for years without 
implementing Article 18.125  Compliance with the Berne Convention did not 
require Congress to enact retroactive protection; it only required some level of 
protection to be given to works of foreign authors that had entered the American 
public domain.126  Congress had the option to take advantage of benefits of Berne 
through less-restrictive methods of compliance.127  Removing works from the 
                                                            
119 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  “Ever since the first U.S. 
patent statute, the patent system appears to have incorporated a strong vision of the divide between 
patentable inventions and technology in the public domain.”  Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965, 977–78 (1990).  
120 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).  
121 Id.  See Kellog Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (holding that when a patent 
falls into the public domain through the disappearance of a monopoly, the public shall be entitled to full 
enjoyment of that which has become theirs). 
122 Bonita, 489 U.S. at 148.  The 1976 Copyright Act states that copyright protection does not 
extend to “any work that goes into the public domain.”  Brief of ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 11, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578555. 
123 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The 
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(creativity should be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause 
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts); Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (stating that works once in the public domain should remain there is 
not a policy incompatible with trade secret protection.); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932) (stating the main objective of monopolies is to derive benefit to the general public by labors of 
authors).   
124 The “bedrock principle” of copyright law: “[W]orks in the public domain remain in the public 
domain.”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 43. 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 18–21.  
126 “Article 18(3) also states that ‘the respective countries shall determine, each in so far as it is 
concerned, the conditions of application of this principle.’” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 18 U.N.T.S. 251).  The plain terms of Berne would have allowed the United States 
to burden substantially less speech, through the “rule of the shorter term” and “protect[ion] of first sale 
rights.”  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 59–60.  “[T]he scope of that protection is essentially 
left to the discretion of each member state.”  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Daniel J. Gervais in 
Support of Petitioners at 6, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470824. 
127 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For example, the United States obtained 
concession regarding the issue of moral rights protection under Berne, Article 6 ibis, which is of great 
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public domain goes against constitutional principles, and should have been handled 
with more caution.128 
Regardless of the method with which Congress decided to comply with 
Berne, “no treaty can authorize the government to do what the Constitution 
otherwise prohibits”; Congress overreached its arms with the enactment of Section 
514.129  This Court has previously established that the government’s chosen means 
must not be “substantially broader than necessary.”130  As it did in Eldred, 
Congress was free to set the term of copyright as long as it was “limited” while 
still complying with the Constitution.131  “[I]f the Progress Clause is to be 
accorded any substantial meaning,” the Supreme Court should not have allowed 
Congress to overstep its powers by allowing restoration of works already in the 
public domain.132  The Framers purposely imposed specific limits on Congress’s 
power in regards to copyright law in order to ensure it would promote, not inhibit, 
the diffusion of knowledge.133 
B.  Distinguishing Eldred  
The Supreme Court falsely relies on the precedent set forth in Eldred, where 
it upheld the constitutionality of CTEA,134 because the Court does not 
acknowledge key distinguishing factors between Eldred and the present case.  The 
CTEA, unlike Section 514, only applied to works under (non-expired) copyright 
protection, it did not remove any works from the public domain.135  “Section 514, 
by contrast, deprives Petitioners, amici and their patrons of access to speech that 
already belonged to the public.”136  At most, the plaintiffs in Eldred could show a 
weak interest in “making other people’s speeches,” but at no point possessed 
unimpeded access to the works in question.137  Conversely, Petitioners in Golan 
freely and rightfully used the “work[s] without restriction, spread its contents, and 
                                                            
importance in European countries.  Brief of Gervais, supra note 126, at 5–6.  “The plain terms of 
Article 18 would have allowed the United States to negotiate agreements that modified or eliminated 
Berne’s restoration requirements to accommodate the unique position of the United States relative to 
any other Berne signatory.”  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 55.  Therefore, Congress could 
have attempted to similarly negotiate terms regarding works of foreign authors already in the public 
domain, without adopting such extreme measures.  Id. 
128 Brief of Gervais, supra note 126, at 8. 
129 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 51; see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988).  “No 
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of 
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”  Id. at 324 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1 (1957)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
130 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).  “It would not be contended that 
[treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character 
of the government or in that of one of the States . . . .”  De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).   
131 Brief for Creative Common, supra note 111, at 20. 
132 Id.   
133 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.  
134 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) Pub. L. No. 105–298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 
(1998) (extending the term of existing (non-expired) copyrights for 20 years.).  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186 (2002). 
135 CTEA, supra note 134. 
136 Brief Amici Curiae American Library Ass’n, et al., in Support of Petitioners at 28, Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533007. 
137 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.  
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use[d] it in the creation of still other works.”138  Moreover, the CTEA was generic 
in nature because it “did not legislate with respect to any particular work.”139  It 
was a subpart of a general statute which extended copyright protection to 
subsisting and future works.140  On the other hand, Section 514 restores rights in a 
select group of works to a particular group of rightsholders, which is not justified 
by the decision in Eldred.141  Such “targeted restoration,” not only “render[s] the 
public domain perpetually vulnerable,” but is divergent from historical 
precedent.142  Therefore, the Supreme Court should have followed the precedent it 
set forth regarding works in the public domain,143 rather than using the Eldred 
reasoning as justification for their decision.  
VI.  IMPACT  
A.  Culture, Education, and Scholarship 
It is essential to understand the span of works in the public domain that are 
subject to restoration through Section 514 in order to comprehend the breadth of 
damage caused by this legislation.144  The category of works that derive restored 
protection are those “that are (1) old; (2) of foreign origin; (3) protected under non-
U.S. law; and that (4) failed to comply with United States’ copyright 
‘formalities.’”145  These works are in the millions146 and are representative of a 
wide array of genres147 published abroad from 1932 to 1989.148 
The public domain is the truest form of free speech, as it benefits society at 
large by giving access to a realm of materials that can be freely used.149  The works 
in the public domain become cultural building blocks and the “basis for our art, our 
                                                            
138 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 3. 
139 Brief for the Creative Common, supra note 111, at 19. 
140 Id. at 18.  “The CTEA continued a practice begun with the Act of 1831, extending the term of 
subsisting copyrights when it extended the term for new copyrights.”  Id. 
141 Id. at 19.  
142 Id.  
143 See supra text accompanying notes 119–23. 
144 See Berne Convention art. 18, supra note 16.  
145 Brief of Google Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533006. 
146 Since the passage of Section 514 in 1994, over 50,000 registration notices have been filed with 
U.S. Copyright Office, by foreign authors.  See Notices of Restored Copyrights, UNITED STATES 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.copyright.gov/gatt.html.  “The works that qualify for 
copyright restoration probably number in the millions.”  Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office, Library of Cong., The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. 
Copyright Office (April 11, 1996), in 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 31 (1996).  
147 The genres of works affected span from musical compositions, cinematographic works, books 
and writings, paintings and pictures, etc.  See Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 5–6 
(“This encompasses wide swathes of our cultural building blocks, including, for example, all Russian 
works published before 1973, including works by Vladimir Nabokov, Maxim Gorky, Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, and Sergei Prokofiev, paintings by Pablo Picasso, drawings by M.C. Escher, and writings 
by such authors as George Orwell, J.R.R. Tolkien, and Virginia Woolf.”). 
148 Golan, 132 S. Ct at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
149 See Litman, supra note 119, at 966 (discussing how the creations of most new works stem from 
usage of works already in the public domain). 
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science, and our self understanding.”150  Prior to this decision, defining the 
boundaries of the public domain and intellectual property has been of great 
importance to the Supreme Court.151  This Court previously iterated the 
significance of these boundaries in regards to patents by stating, “[a] patent holder 
should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.”152 
The advent of new technologies makes it increasingly possible for works in 
the public domain to be disseminated to millions of people in more ways than 
before.153  In today’s world, “the public’s historic legal rights of access to these 
materials [are] a practical reality.”154  Cultural institutions, non-profit educational 
resources, and businesses “seek to serve the global community by collecting and 
sharing” work in the public domain through digital libraries and encyclopedias, 
digital repositories, and internet archives.155  Technology, most importantly the 
Internet, makes it simple for individuals to utilize “millions of public domain texts, 
films, and sound recordings with ease,” at a fraction of the cost.156  Use of these 
works by the general public, fuels constitutional principles, by promoting creativity 
in the arts and sciences.157  In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt deemed the 
public domain to be the source of “the great tools of scholarship, the great 
repositories of culture, and the great symbols of freedom of the mind”; an essential 
component to the “functioning of a democratic society.”158   
The purpose of copyright law and the public domain is to give the public 
access to materials to fuel innovation and creativity159—an unstable public domain 
                                                            
150 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 39 (2008). 
Boyle believes the public domain is comprised of “the raw material from which we make new 
inventions and create new cultural works.”  Id.  “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to 
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.”  CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 
(1981). 
151 “Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through 
access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated 
as clearly as possible.”  Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994).  
152 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
153 Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136.  “Thanks to the Internet and other new 
technologies, Amici are able to preserve and share a vast wealth of information, allowing a virtually 
unlimited number of patrons worldwide access to digitized books, photographs, music, and other 
works.”  Id. at 1.  
154 Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 11.  
155 See Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 1; Brief for Google, supra note 144.  
156 Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 9.  “[D]igital reproduction and distribution 
can be far less expensive than older distribution forms, public domain materials can be distributed, 
reproduced, and recombined on a vast scale.”  Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 18.  
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The Constitution is founded on the principle to promote creativity 
for the “Progress of Science.”  Id. 
158 PATTI CLAYTON BECKER, BOOKS AND LIBRARIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY DURING WORLD WAR II: 
WEAPONS IN THE WAR OF IDEAS 49 (2005).  
159  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“The primary 
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.’  To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).  “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”  Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975).  
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has the exact opposite effect.160  It is essential the public domain be clearly bound 
and set apart from the domain of monopoly.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
created a haze over this line of separation through the enactment of Section 514, 
the unconstitutional impact of which will halt the spread of culture and education 
in the United States.161  The parties most “affected by Section 514 are neither 
copyright holders nor reliance parties, but rather members of the general public 
who regularly rely on (or would benefit from access to) public domain works that 
are, or could be, made available online for information, educational, and creative 
purposes.”162  Works affected by Section 514 are removed from the public domain, 
which effectively shrinks the pool of information available to the public.163  This 
consequently diminishes the public’s right to receive information, and more 
importantly, the voice of the community.164 
Much of culture and education in the United States stems from the various 
expressions and interpretations of materials originally in the public domain.165  For 
example, “Walt Disney drew from the public domain to create prolific, culture-
defining films like Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.”166  Websites like 
Wikipedia provide a wealth of information comprised of massive collaborations, 
millions of articles, and hundreds of languages.167  
The impact of Section 514 on the “Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is 
vividly illustrated in the music industry.168  Post implementation of Section 514, 
many conductors and orchestras were required to pay rental fees on “landmark 
works of twentieth-century music . . . by Prokofiev, Stravinsky, Shostakovich, and 
others.”169  Outside of the few wealthy institutions that could afford to rent the 
rights to perform these works, the financial burden on smaller local and regional 
music organizations has been tremendous.170  This has a “debilitating effect on 
music scholarship.”171  This legislation has the same crippling effect in film, 
                                                            
160 Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 18; see discussion infra Part VI.C.   
161 See generally Briefs as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).  
162 Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 4.  
163 Id.  
164 Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 27.  “[Section 514] inhibits the spread of 
existing works, reduces the universe of material available to the public for further creation, and 
threatens to destroy the incentive to use even those works that remain unprotected.  It impedes both the 
creation of knowledge and its spread.”  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 24. 
165 See Litman, supra note 119, at 966–67.  
166 Brief for Creative Commons, supra note 111, at 6.  There were at least three other film 
adaptations to Snow White before Walt Disney created the hit animation film.  Brief for Peter 
Decherney as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 
10-545), 2011 WL 2470832.  In many films it is the audience’s familiarity with characters, story lines, 
plots, and a fan-base that turns movies into major blockbusters.  Id.  This is true for many Disney hits 
such as Little Red Riding Hood, Alice in Wonderland, Aladdin, and Jack and the Beanstalk, all of 
which, absent works in the public domain, would not have been possible.  Id. at 17.  
167 Brief for Creative Commons, supra note 111, at 7.  
168 See Brief of the Conductors Guild and the Music Library Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470828. 
169 Id. at 2.  
170 Id.  A librarian at a music conservatory warns that if the affected works become “too expensive 
to buy, no one will explore their performance or undertake their recordings. We will curtail intellectual 
curiosity and diminish our cultural heritage.”  Id. at 13. 
171 Id.  “All of these developments lessened the ability of music libraries to fulfill their educational 
and public-service missions.”  Id. at 6.  Many people will be required to “cease activities such as 
2012 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REGIME 151 
 
media, and various other industries—industries that were effectively created by the 
public domain.172  Furthermore, this legislation has the potential to hinder society’s 
use of technological advancements.173  The possibility of harms caused to the 
public through this legislation is endless.   
B.  Frivolous First Amendment Safeguard Provisions  
The Supreme Court references the “built in First Amendment 
accommodations,”174 of the “fair use defense” and the “idea/expression” 
dichotomy175 as speech protective outlets and safeguards, which still allow society 
to use the works affected by Section 514.176  However, by no means are these 
provisions an adequate substitute or appropriate compensation for removing works 
from the public domain.177  Neither of these safeguards would allow the public to 
create derivative interpretations or perform the works in their entirety.178  It is a 
stretch for Congress to believe these safeguards, which provide limited access to 
copyrighted materials, are a justification for withdrawing works in which the 
general public previously had unfettered access.179  Many times, it is necessary to 
replicate the exact expression of the work for its use to be valuable.180  Moreover, 
even if the copyright holder does grant permission of use, they are permitted to 
demand license fees that can fall outside the budget of many creators.181  It is 
                                                            
performing or experimenting with works they have spent decades mastering, unless they obtain the 
‘rightsholders’ consent, which may be withheld for any reason, or no reason at all.”  Brief for Google, 
supra note 144, at 18–19.  
172 See Brief of Decherney, supra note 165 (arguing the public domain facilitated the birth and 
expansion of the film industry, brought stability to Hollywood, and allowed the founding of cinematic 
genres).  
173 See Amicus Brief on Behalf of Project Petrucci, L.L.C., in Support of Petitioners at 27–28, 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578554.  This legislation also has the 
potential of hindering public use of technological advancements.  The International Music Score 
Library Project (“IMSLP”) launched an iPad application allowing users to access sheet music on their 
mobile devices.  Id.  Instead of orchestra’s paying costly per-performance fees, they could have 
instantaneous, unlimited, and free access to thousands of IMSLP’s scores via application, thus never 
paying for sheet music again.  Id.  The potential of the public domain through these types of 
technological advancements are endless.  Id.   
174 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002).  
175 See supra text and accompanying notes 65–66.  Fair use and idea/expression dichotomy 
provisions are codified by 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 102(b), respectively.  
176 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.  
177 “Neither fair use nor the idea/expression dichotomy addresses all the ways in which copyright 
restrictions can abridge freedom of speech.”  Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 26.  
178 Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir.).  The fair use defense is confined to the 
standard of what types of use a “reasonable copyright owner” may have consented to.  Harper & Row 
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1939).  Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy only 
applies to “idea, theory, and fact in . . . copyrighted work[s].”  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.  Therefore, both 
safeguards are extremely limited in their ability to disseminate the restored works in a capacity that 
would prove useful to anyone other than the rightholder.  
179 “By withdrawing works from the public domain, § 514 leaves scholars, artists, and the public 
with less access to works than they had before the Act.”  Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.  The main concern is 
one of public interest and public necessity.  See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: 
Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010).  
180 “Playing a few bars of a Shostakovich symphony is no substitute for performing the entire 
work.”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 47. 
181 See Brief of the Conductors Guild, supra note 167, at 7.  For example, one conductor stated his 
group would no longer perform a number of Igor Stravinsky’s works they previously performed 
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implausible to think these are adequate measures to alleviate the burden placed on 
prospective authors and the general public.182   
The Supreme Court references other measures Congress adopted to ease the 
transition of parties affected by the loss of access to restored works: “[i]t deferred 
the date from which enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration 
on ‘reliance parties’ who exploited foreign works denied protection before 
[Section] 514 took effect.”183  Yet again, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of 
Congress’s attempt to rectify the damage done by the enactment of Section 514 is 
troubling given the digital age upon us.184  The one-year grace period afforded is a 
provision set in place so reliance parties can disseminate copies of the works made 
before they were put on notice by the Federal Register.185  In the Internet age, most 
distribution of works occurs online via downloads and websites.  However, after a 
reliance party is given notice, the statute requires websites to immediately rectify 
and comply with the provisions of the legislation, or run the risk of facing 
liability.186  As a result, most reliance parties, out of fear of facing liability, do not 
really benefit from the grace period Congress identifies.187  
C.  Business and the Copyright Industry  
The statute provides that any reliance party that wishes to utilize a restored 
work can do so by negotiating adequate compensation with the rightsholders, or 
paying what the district court determines is a reasonable amount.188  However, 
with regard to “orphan works,” this seemingly reasonable provision can result in 
                                                            
because the fees to perform, post enactment of Section 514, are at least $300, which is outside the 
budget of the ensemble.  Id.  Similarly, a conductor for a university orchestra reported fees to rent 
certain essential pieces of compositions can exceed $1,200.  Id.  
182 “Users and secondary authors cannot simply rely on the existence of fair use; it must be 
privately litigated based on a different set of facts each time it is invoked.”  Brief of Amici Curiae, 
Information Society Project at Yale Law School Professors and Fellows, in Support of Petitioners at 21, 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470834. 
183 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. 
184 See Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 14. 
185 17 U.S.C § 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(III)–(B)(ii)(III).  As against reliance parties, all of 17 U.S.C § 
504’s copyright infringement remedies are available if copies or phonorecords of a restored work are 
made after either (i) publication in the Federal Register of notice of intent to enforce copyright or (ii) 
receipt of notice directly from the owner.  17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2).  Once notice is received, or 
published in the Federal Register, a reliance party must immediately cease copying and is granted 
twelve months solely for the purpose of selling off his or her inventory.  Id.  
186 Id. 
187 Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 16.  This leaves no window for Internet based 
reliance parties to investigate or verify claims of copyright status before incurring liability.  Id.  
188 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii).  
 [A] reliance party may continue to exploit that derivative work for the 
duration of the restored copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the 
restored copyright reasonable compensation for conduct which would be subject 
to a remedy for infringement but for the provisions of this paragraph. 
 (B) In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the amount of such 
compensation shall be determined by an action in United States district court, 
and shall reflect any harm to the actual or potential market for or value of the 
restored work from the reliance party’s continued exploitation of the work, as 
well as compensation for the relative contributions of expression of the author of 
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work. 
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii)–(B) (emphasis added). 
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extraordinary administrative costs.189  The process of determining if the work’s 
copyright has been restored, searching for the author, and negotiating a price, can 
be a timely, expensive, and many times, an impossible process:190 a hassle which 
small businesses will infrequently seek to undertake.191  Due to the foreign nature 
of the majority of restored works, registration and renewals are lost, and copyright 
owners, especially if they are not famous, are difficult to identify.192  These vague 
parameters of the public domain, “inject[] uncertainty and confusion . . . into the 
marketplace, preventing ideas, capital, and commerce from flowing efficiently.”193  
This is especially the case for those on “shoestring budgets” that are not willing or 
able to invest in works that could potentially lead to an act of infringement.194  
Although the statute provides that claims and assertions made against a 
restored copyright that are materially false will be void, this does not ease the 
tensions of the fear of litigation for potential businesses and users.195  Congress did 
not make any attempts to alleviate the associated administrative costs.196  Rather, 
this legislation instilled a fear of copyright-based interference or liability in the 
public, which deters business and investment.197   
Furthermore, by restoring copyrights, Section 514 restricts the utilization and 
dissemination of works because the absence of competition directly translates into 
higher consumer prices.198  An unencumbered and reliable public domain supports 
                                                            
189 See supra text accompanying note 92.  
190 The 1976 Copyright Act removed the need for formalities in copyright registration.  Brief for 
Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 21. 
191 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012)  (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Counsel for the College 
Art Association explained to the Copyright Office in a letter, “The vast majority of foreign works were 
never registered, so registrations and renewals cannot be found to identify the rights owners, 
particularly if they are not famous . . . . In the vast majority of cases, identifying, finding and clearing 
rights is realistically impossible.”  Cunard Letter, Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 33–34; see 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) (“figuring out who is in the 
line of ‘origin’ will be no simple task”); Brief for Google, supra note 143, at 14 (“the difficulty and cost 
of even locating the relevant ‘rightsholder’ from whom a license might be negotiated are very often 
insurmountable”). 
192 For example, the University of Michigan and the Institute of Museum and Library Services, 
estimated the cost to determine copyright status of books in the HathiTrust Digital Library published 
between 1923–1963, will exceed $1 million.  Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 15. 
193 Id. at 18.  “Where the owner cannot be found to license a work, the music is not likely to be used 
due to fear of reprisal.”  Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 22.   
194 Brief for Public Domain, supra note 104, at 32.  “Shoestring budget” refers to parties unable to 
handle the large licensing fees or potential lawsuits that may arise from use of the restored works.  Id.  
Examples of such parties include “documentary filmmakers, independent musicians, educators, non-
profits—and those who archive, organize, or distribute large numbers of works . . . .”  Id.   
195 17 U.S.C. § 104A(e)(3).  “Effect of material false statements.—Any material false statement 
knowingly made with respect to any restored copyright identified in any notice of intent shall make 
void all claims and assertions made with respect to such restored copyright.”  Most parties that would 
actually be affected are small and therefore even the threat of a potential lawsuit will deter use. 
196 “Congress could have alleviated many of the costs that the statute imposes by, for example, 
creating forms of compulsory licensing, requiring ‘restored copyright’ holders to provide necessary 
administrative information as a condition of protection, or insisting upon ‘reasonable royalties.’”  
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
197 Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 16–17.  Individuals “have hewed public domain precisely 
because these are understood as avoiding complexities, costly historical searches, and legal risk.”  Id. at 
17; see BOYLE, supra note 148, at 12 (discussing how many libraries will not make available or 
reproduce materials unless they can be sure the copyright expired.  “They cannot afford to take the 
risk.”)  
198 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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numerous business models and innovative practices because it decreases the 
transaction costs required to exploit the works.199  A decrease in transaction costs 
reduces risk and encourages business.  Unfortunately, Section 514 has quite the 
opposite effect.200  
Big business and investors are an integral part of the copyright industry and 
are essential to the creation of many new works.201  Businesses, such as venture 
capital firms, are much more willing to invest if they can be confident about the 
boundaries of copyright and the public domain because they negotiate and assess 
the value of their investments.202  However, weak parameters over the public 
domain leave open the threat of additional licensing fees and litigation costs for 
unsolicited use, which daunt business and investment.203  The uncertainty of the 
return on investment pushes businesses past their accepted level of risk aversion, 
and consequently hinders their investment in the copyright industry.204  
Additionally, some businesses’ livelihoods are directly linked to their ability to 
exploit works already in the public domain.205  The cloud over the public domain 
creates a grey area of works that could potentially lead to legal battles that most 
businesses will attempt to avoid.206   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The main question at issue is which view of copyright law the United States 
                                                            
199 Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 18–19.  
200 The amicus brief discusses risk and liability from a business perspective.  
In business terms, risk is liability multiplied by probability. Under our current 
copyright regime, liability is immense while the probability of liability is 
uncertain, but ever increasing. While the value of the Public Domain is 
undeniable, a businessperson less dedicated to the sanctity of the Public Domain 
would likely have little interest in such an enterprise.  
Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 9–10. 
201 Brief of Heartland Angels, Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14–15, Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470833.  For example, the cost of new motion 
picture can cost studios in the millions, which would not be possible without outside investment.  Id.  
Investors will not invest in the development of movies if they are not confident in an environment 
where they may be subject to litigation for use of unprotected works.  Id. at 15.  However, without 
investment money, new works (movies) cannot exist.  Id. 
202 Brief of Heartland Angels, supra note 200, at 9–10.  Heartland Angels is a private equity 
organization that seeks out small companies to invest in during early stages of company development.  
Id. at 1.  The legislation especially impacts corporations such as Heartland that try to minimize and 
calculate the risk of their investments.  Id. at 1–2.  Uncertainty in the public domain for corporations 
like Heartland discourages such firms from investing in the copyright industry.  Id. 
203 Id. at 16.  Private equity investment companies typically have a reasonable investment-backed 
expectation that works will remain in the public domain.  Id.  Section 514 raises licensing costs for 
target companies, which lower the investing company’s return on investment (“ROI”).  Id.  A negative 
ROI will push a company past its willing level of risk aversion, thus thwarting investment in the 
creation of new works.  Id.  
204 Brief of Heartland Angels, supra note 199. 
205 Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 4.  For example, Google Scholar freely makes legal 
opinions in the public domain searchable and available.  Id.  The Google Art Project showcases high-
resolution images of public domain art famous museums around the world.  Id.  Google has made 
millions of books available for online reading and download for free.  Id. 
206 “[T]he Public Domain is a laudable and important enterprise, [but] it is not necessarily profitable 
enough to offset its inherent exposure to copyright liability.”  Brief of Project Petrucci, supra note 172, 
at 9. 
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should adhere to.  Founders of American copyright law based our Constitution on 
utilitarian principles that promote the spread of knowledge and information to the 
general public.  It has always been held that innovation and creativity were of core 
importance in an efficiently functioning democratic society.  With the passing of 
Section 514, the United States digressed from its national roots in order to comply 
with an international regime of copyright law.  This decision in Golan takes steps 
to afford private economic benefit to a few copyright holders at the expense of the 
public at large: a notion against constitutional principles.  Congress and the 
Supreme Court have rationalized American compliance with international law at 
the great cost of impeding education and culture, discouraging business and 
investment, and creating a grey cloud over the public domain and copyright 
industry.  Prior to this decision, the United States has never succumbed to the 
pressures of international adherence at national expense, and we should not start 
now.  Again, if it is unfair for the neighborhood to lose out on Granny’s fruit 
baskets, it is equally unfair on the American public to lose access to works in the 
public domain.  
